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TEXAS OIL AND GAS: THE KEY THAT
EXPANDED LESSEES’ SURFACE-USE TO
ALL TRACTS IN A POOLED UNIT
By: Stephen L. Parker*
ABSTRACT
The mineral estate is the dominant estate over the surface estate in Texas,
and nowhere is this clearer than the production of oil and gas. An oil and gas
operator can use as much of the surface as is reasonably necessary to effectu-
ate the purpose of its oil and gas lease, subject to few limitations. Under a
pooling clause and the Texas Supreme Court’s ruling in Key Operating &
Equipment, Inc. v. Hegar, operators can burden the surface of a tract of land
for the benefit of an entire pooled oil and gas unit. Synthesizing Key with the
Texas Supreme Court’s rulings in Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Dixon and
Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard allows operators to burden surface own-
ers for the benefit of these large pooled oil and gas units—even with post-
severance pooling agreements and expired oil and gas leases. Further, as prop-
erty owners sever the surface estate from their mineral estate, surface owners
are left without power to negotiate with oil and gas operators interested in the
mineral estate only.
The Texas Railroad Commission should require all operator–lessees make
a good-faith effort to enter surface-use agreements with surface owners in
pooled oil and gas units. Requiring this of all operator–lessees benefits both
the surface owners and the operators, even when a surface owner refuses to
enter the surface-use agreement. Finally, there are other options the Texas
Railroad Commission may consider to correct this issue; however, requiring
operators make a good-faith attempt to acquire a surface-use agreement is the
cheapest and most efficient way to address this issue without changing Texas
oil and gas law jurisprudence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Texas, when the minerals are severed from the surface of a tract
of land, whether by deed or mineral lease, a dominant estate and a
servient estate is created, with the surface estate becoming servient to
the dominant mineral estate.1 This gives the holder of the mineral es-
tate the right to use as much of the land, including the surface, as is
reasonably necessary to produce the minerals.2 Further, when a min-
eral owner leases the mineral estate to a third party, the dominant
estate transfers to the lessee for the life of the lease.3 This fundamen-
tal principle allows a lessee or operator to use as much of the surface
that is reasonably necessary to comply with the lease and to “effectu-
ate its purposes.”4 In other words, the lessee has an implied easement
across the surface to use as much of the surface as is reasonably neces-
sary to produce the minerals under the leased tract.5 Yet the holder of
the surface estate maintains all rights of “possession, powers of con-
trol, occupancy, use, and alienation.”6
A lessee will often pool multiple contiguous tracts of land together
to form a pooled unit for production purposes.7 When this occurs, the
pooled unit becomes one tract of land for production purposes, and
production anywhere in the pooled unit counts as production every-
where within the pooled unit—this maintains all the oil and gas leases
in the pooled unit as long as the well is producing.8 If a pooled unit
effectively becomes one tract of land for production purposes, and if
1. 3 JAMES N. JOHNSON, TEXAS PRACTICE GUIDE REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
§ 17:82 (2011).
2. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248–49 (Tex. 2013).
3. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 624 (Tex. 1971).
4. Id. (citing Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1967);
Brown v. Lundell, 344 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1961); Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo,
304 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1957); Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 271 S.W.2d 410 (Tex.
1954)).
5. See Texaco, Inc. v. Farris, 413 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1967, writ
ref’d n.r.e.).
6. JOHNSON, supra note 1.
7. JOSEPH SHADE & RONNIE BLACKWELL, PRIMER ON THE TEXAS LAW OF OIL
& GAS 128 (5th ed. 2013).
8. Se. Pipe Line Co. v. Tichacek, 997 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. 1999).
2016] SURFACE-USE IN A POOLED UNIT 723
production anywhere in the unit counts as production everywhere in
the unit, then the question becomes whether pooling a tract automati-
cally gives a lessee the right to access the surface of all tracts within
the pooled unit.
In Key Operating & Equipment, Inc. v. Hegar, the Texas Supreme
Court appeared to answer in the affirmative.9 After that decision,
multiple legal commentators throughout the state generally suggested
the case stood for the lessee being able to invoke the dominant estate
theory on any tract within a pooled unit.10 However, is this really what
the Texas Supreme Court intended? A thorough reading of Texas case
law suggests lessees have fewer restrictions than ever to access the
entire surface within a pooled oil and gas unit under the dominant
estate theory, the reasonable use doctrine, and the Key ruling. Can a
pooling agreement expand the dominant estate theory of a neighbor-
ing tract within an oil and gas unit upon a surface owner who owned
the surface before the neighboring mineral owner executed an oil and
gas lease? What if the lease terminates but the pooling agreement is
still valid?
This Note examines the effect of the Texas Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Key11 on a surface owner’s rights—or lack thereof—under
a pooled unit. Further, this Note explores how powerful the Court’s
ruling is when synthesized with other landmark cases, in particular,
Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard12 and Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp. v.
Dixon.13 However, before the discussion,14 this Note begins with an
introduction—or review—of some basic oil and gas ideas and terms in
Part I. Part II discusses several cases showing how much leniency
courts give the dominant mineral estate and its power over the surface
in an oil and gas lease, along with some of the exceptions to the domi-
9. Key Operating & Equip., Inc. v. Hegar, 435 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. 2014).
10. See John McFarland, Texas Supreme Court Decides Key Operating v. Hegar,
OIL AND GAS LAWYER BLOG (June 23, 2014), http://www.oilandgaslawyerblog.com/
2014/06/texas-supreme-court-decids-key.html [https://perma.cc/5XZN-9QWW] (“The
legal precedent the Court followed is this: when two tracts are combined to create a
pooled unit, the operator of the unit has the right to use the surface of all of the land
covered by the leases included in the unit to operate wells located anywhere on the
unit, regardless of the location of the well.”); Butch Marseglia & Jillian Marullo, A
Key Decision: Supreme Court of Texas Sides with Liskow Amicus Brief on Behalf of
TXOGA, THE ENERGY LAW BLOG (June 24, 2014), http://www.theenergylawblog
.com/2014/06/articles/litigation/a-key-decision-supreme-court-of-texas-sides-with-lis
kow-amicus-brief-on-behalf-of-txoga [https://perma.cc/8L4Z-B8KQ]; Betty Q. Rich-
mond, Key Operating & Equipment, Inc. v. Hegar Case Study, OIL AND GAS LEGAL
BLOG (June 30, 2014, 12:20 PM), http://www.oilandgaslegalblog.com/key-operating-
equipment-inc-v-hegar-case-study [https://perma.cc/DM7D-XGCV].
11. Key Operating, 435 S.W.3d at 794.
12. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008).
13. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Dixon, 737 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1987,
writ denied).
14. See infra Part V.
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nant mineral estate.15 Part III focuses on pooling then dives head first
into Wagner and the Court’s holding that a pooling agreement is valid
after an oil and gas lease terminates.
Part IV synthesizes the material and looks at reasonable use under
a pooled oil and gas unit. In particular, Part IV discusses the other two
cases mentioned above, Key and Delhi. Then Part V looks at several
unforeseen consequences through hypothetical examples that could
potentially happen in Texas jurisprudence by synthesizing Key, Wag-
ner, and Delhi. For example, what happens if the minerals are severed
before the pooling agreement? Can a mineral owner expand the dom-
inant mineral estate over the surface owner to bear the burden from
all lands within a pooled unit by executing a pooling agreement “con-
tract” with a lessee—even when the pooling agreement is subsequent
to the mineral severance and the surface owner is not privy to the
pooling agreement? The penultimate section, Part VI, offers a solu-
tion to the surface owner’s ever-dwindling rights under an oil and gas
pooled unit that benefits both the surface owner and the
operator–lessee.
II. DOMINANT ESTATE
Subsequent purchasers of the surface estate “take their parcels sub-
ject to the mineral owner’s preexisting rights and a mineral owner’s
right of surface-use is not affected by subsequent actions of the sur-
face owner.”16 Further, “[t]his implied surface easement of reasonable
usage extends to the surface of the pooled or unitized area.”17 This
Part will explore reasonable surface-use freedoms granted to lessees
and a few limits to reasonable use, including negligence by a lessee
and the Accommodation Doctrine.
A. Just How Dominant is that Estate?
“[T]he owner-operator of the lease has the right to use so much of
the land, both surface and subsurface, as is reasonably necessary to
comply with the terms of the lease contract and to carry out the pur-
poses and intentions of the parties.”18 Generally in Texas, if the lessee
and surface owner do not sign a surface-use agreement, the lessee re-
imburses the surface owner only for damages from negligent or unrea-
sonable acts.19 In Humble Oil, the lessee’s building and using of a road
across the surface to access the pad site was not unreasonable even
though the surface owner proved the value of his land diminished sig-
15. See infra Part II.
16. ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND
GAS § 2.1[B][1] at 2–16 (2d ed. 2011).
17. Prop. Owners of Leisure Land, Inc. v. Woolf & Magee, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 757,
760 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1990, no writ).
18. Brown v. Lundell, 344 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. 1961).
19. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133, 134–35 (Tex. 1967).
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nificantly due to the road.20 The Texas Supreme Court reasoned that
the diminution in value did “not relate to damages from an excessive,
unnecessary, or unreasonable use of the property; it relate[d] to the
road itself which Humble had the right to build.”21
Further, in Texas the lessee does not have an obligation to restore
the surface of a tract unless there is a surface-use agreement.22 In
Warren Petroleum Corp., the surface owner did not prove that the
lessee acted negligently or used more of the surface than was reasona-
bly necessary for the lessee’s pursuit of production.23 As a result, the
lessee was not responsible for its damages to the surface even though
the lessee failed to restore the surface and left slush pits unfilled, ruts
from the heavy machinery, and a gravel road to the pad site.
A mineral owner has the right to use as much of a tract of land as is
reasonably necessary—including the surface—but the mineral owner
should exercise these rights with due regard for the rights of the sur-
face owner.24 A lessee’s use of the surface of a tract to effectuate the
lease should be reasonably necessary to operate an oil or gas well and
produce the minerals.25 If a lessee’s use of the surface is unnecessary
or unreasonable, then the lessee exceeds the surface rights granted to
the mineral owner as holder of the dominant estate, and the lessee
may be trespassing.26
The burden of proof to show that a lessee’s use of the surface was
not reasonable or necessary is on the surface owner, however, who
must show that the lessee had reasonable alternative means to pro-
duce the minerals.27 And “[w]hether the lease’s grant of the dominant
estate carries the right to use the particular easement is a fact ques-
tion.”28 But certain actions by the lessee are privileged as a matter of
law, such as where to place the pad site and when to begin
operations.29
As a general rule under Texas law, the lessee can place a well on
any portion of the surface of a unit, subject to any legal regulatory
20. Id. at 135.
21. Id.
22. Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 304 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1957).
23. Id.
24. Trenolone v. Cook Expl. Co., 166 S.W.3d 495, 498 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2005, no pet.).
25. Oryx Energy Co. v. Shelton, 942 S.W.2d 637, 640 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, no
writ).
26. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971); Haupt, Inc. v. Tarrant
Cty. Water Control and Imp. Dist. No. One, 870 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. App.—Waco 1994,
no writ); Johnson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 93 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo
1936, no writ).
27. Getty Oil, 470 S.W.2d at 623; Trenolone, 166 S.W.3d at 498; Ottis v. Haas, 569
S.W.2d 508, 514 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ refused n.r.e.).
28. Trenolone, 166 S.W.3d at 498.
29. Robinson Drilling Co. v. Moses, 256 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tex. Civ. App.—East-
land 1953, no writ).
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restrictions, restrictions contained in the oil and gas lease, and the Ac-
commodation Doctrine.30 A surface owner and a court of law cannot
question a lessee’s judgment in deciding when and where to drill a
well.31 Further, as long as the lessee’s decisions are not unreasonable,
the lessee can place roads and equipment necessary to produce the
minerals wherever the lessee deems necessary.32 For example, in Ottis
v. Haas, the surface owner sought an injunction against the lessee for
a tank battery the lessee placed about 400 feet from the surface
owner’s home.33 The surface owner proved the tank battery could be
moved with minimal cost and interference to the lessee’s production;
however, the court ruled the surface owner’s inconvenience alone
without damages was not a valid reason to even consider requiring the
lessee move tools necessary for producing the minerals.34
Finally, courts allow small inconveniences by the lessee to the sur-
face owner, and a surface owner cannot impede or interfere with
lessee’s access to the surface for oil and gas production.35 For exam-
ple, in Davis, to reach the well and tank batteries, the court allowed
the lessee to build roads across the surface out of caliche—a cement
and calcium carbonate mixture shown to hinder the surface owner’s
ability to farm—because the impact on the surface owner’s farming
was not substantial.36 In addition to specific lease terms, two signifi-
cant limitations to reasonable use are negligence by the opera-
tor–lessee and the Accommodation Doctrine.
B. Limitations to Reasonable Use
1. Negligence
A surface owner wishing to receive money from a lessee for surface
damages must prove that the specific acts were negligent or that the
lessee used more of the surface than reasonably necessary.37 Usually,
if a court finds a lessee acted negligently, the actions of the lessee are
extreme. Two Texas Supreme Court cases provide helpful examples:
First, in General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, the Court found negligence
after the lessee “constructed its salt water disposal pit upon a location
uphill from and higher in elevation than a fresh water seep spring on
30. Gulf Oil Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 152 S.W.2d 711, 724 (Tex. 1941).
31. Grimes v. Goodman Drilling Co., 216 S.W. 202 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth
1919, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (holding that a lessee who pooled several tracts to form a unit
could place a well in the front yard of one of the lessors).
32. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Walton, 317 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1958, no
writ).
33. Ottis v. Haas, 569 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus Christi 1979, writ
ref’d n.r.e.).
34. Id.
35. Davis v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., 136 S.W.3d 419, 425 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2004, no pet.).
36. Id.
37. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. 1967).
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plaintiff’s premises and operated it in such a manner as to pollute the
underground waters that fed the spring.”38 In Brown v. Lundell, the
Court found the lessee liable for the damages it negligently caused by
disposing of salt water in a manner that failed to prevent the salt water
from draining into the subsurface, which contaminated the surface
owner’s groundwater supply.39
In addition to surface damages, a negligent lessee can be liable for
damages to a surface owner’s livestock. In Texaco, Inc. v. Spires, the
court ruled in favor of the surface owner after the surface owner
proved that the lessee improperly built a cattle guard and that the
surface owner told the lessee that the cattle guard was incorrectly con-
structed, but the lessee refused to replace it.40 The surface owner also
told the lessee to clear the dirt and grass out from under the cattle
guard because the surface owner’s horse preferred the long grass
under the cattle guard that the lessee constructed.41 As a result of the
lessee’s failure to take care of the cattle guard, the surface owner’s
horse broke its leg, requiring the surface owner to euthanize his
horse.42
Notwithstanding the court’s decision in Texaco Inc., generally when
a surface owner’s livestock are injured, the surface owner’s duty to
prove the lessee acted unreasonably or negligently is steep. For exam-
ple, in Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, the surface owner’s cows
died after drinking oil that leaked from the well and pooled on top of
the surface near the well. The Court did not hold the lessee liable.43
The Court stated that the “mere fact that [the lessee] permitted oil to
escape and form in small pools within five feet of the well, without any
showing as to the manner in which the lease was being operated at the
time, could not form the basis for . . . negligence.”44 The surface owner
did not prove the lessee’s equipment was not working properly or that
the lessee conducted operations negligently.45 The Court held the
lessee did not have a duty to put a fence around the vicinity of the well
to keep livestock out, and the lessee only owed a duty to the surface
owner not to intentionally injure the surface owner’s livestock.46
Finally, even when a surface owner can prove a lessee acted negli-
gently in damaging the surface owner’s livestock, Texas courts do not
necessarily rule in favor of the surface owner. For example, in Weaver
v. Reed, the surface owner proved the lessee negligently left an open
38. Gen. Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 344 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Tex. 1961).
39. Brown v. Lundell, 344 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. 1961).
40. Texaco, Inc. v. Spires, 435 S.W.2d 550, 552 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1968,
writ ref’d n.r.e.).
41. Id. at 551.
42. Id.
43. Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 271 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. 1954).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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bucket of poisonous pipe lubricant around the pad site where the sur-
face owner’s cattle could have consumed it.47 The court ruled that
leaving the poisonous pipe lubricant around the pad site was a reason-
able use of the surface for lessee’s operations, and the conduct was not
negligent although some of the surface owner’s cattle died from alleg-
edly consuming the pipe lubricant from the fence or in the open
bucket.48 The court held that there was no proof that leaving the poi-
sonous bucket out was the proximate cause of the cattle’s death.49
The operators and lessees, however, lose their fair share of negli-
gence lawsuits.50 Further, there is another limitation to reasonable use
when there is a pre-existing surface-use and the operator has reasona-
ble alternatives. This balancing test is termed “the Accommodation
Doctrine.”
2. The Accommodation Doctrine
Under the Accommodation Doctrine, if the mineral owner’s sur-
face-use “will substantially impair existing surface uses and the mineral
owner has reasonable alternatives available, the mineral owner may
have to accommodate the surface owner if the benefit of the accom-
modation outweighs the burdens of the alternatives.”51
One of the more famous illustrations of the Accommodation Doc-
trine is in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones.52 There, the surface owner bought
the surface subject to several oil and gas leases.53 The surface owner
installed an irrigation sprinkler system consisting of pipes and wheels
that self-rotated around a pivot point to water his crops.54 The irriga-
tion pipes rotated about seven feet above the surface.55 Subsequently,
the lessee drilled two wells and installed two pumps that sat higher
than seven feet and prevented the surface owner from using four of
his six irrigation sprinklers.56 The surface owner filed suit against the
lessee because the lessee did not reasonably install the pumps, thereby
preventing the surface owner from using the irrigation sprinkler.57 The
Court weighed the lessee’s alternative method for producing the min-
erals—burying the pumps in cellars—against the surface owner’s al-
ternative method for irrigating the crops—hiring laborers to irrigate
47. Weaver v. Reed, 303 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1957, no
writ).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Although the previous examples appear extreme, surface owners often win
negligence law suits against operators and lessees because the venue is usually located
in the surface owner’s home county. SHADE & BLACKWELL, supra note 7, at 29.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
53. Id. at 620.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 621.
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the farm.58 The Court reasoned that the surface owner’s only means of
producing agriculture on the property was the sprinkler system be-
cause of a labor shortage in the area,59 and held that the lessee should
accommodate the surface owner and bury the pumps, allowing maxi-
mum use of the minerals and the surface.60
Despite the Court’s decision in Getty, courts usually distinguish
Getty and rarely find for the surface owner under the Accommodation
Doctrine.61 One reason is the surface owner’s burden of proof.62 A
surface owner who believes a lessee did not accommodate the current
surface-use must prove: (1) the lessee’s use prevents or substantially
limits the current surface-use; (2) the surface owner does not have an
alternative solution to the current surface-use; and (3) the lessee has
reasonable alternatives to recover the minerals that allow the surface
owner’s continued use of the surface.63 Some scholars even argue that
the Getty court’s discussion of “conditional submission” created a
fourth element for the surface owners to prove before questioning
whether the mineral owner has reasonable alternatives—that the sur-
face owner lacks reasonable alternatives for the pre-existing surface-
use.64
Although some state statutes,65 the Accommodation Doctrine, and
negligence claims attempt to limit operator–lessees’ use of the surface,
operator–lessees maintain a substantial amount of freedom to ex-
plore, drill, build roads and storage tanks, install pipelines, and use the
surface owner’s water to effectuate the purpose of a mineral lease—so
long as it is reasonably necessary.66 In short, Texas jurisprudence con-
tinues to favor the rights of the mineral owner over the surface
owner.67
58. Id. at 622.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 622–23.
61. Harper Estes & Douglas Prieto, Contracts as Fences: Representing the Agricul-
tural Producer in an Oil and Gas Environment, 73 TEX. B.J. 378, 379 (May 2010).
62. Id.
63. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. 2013).
64. See Courtney R. Potter, Comment, The Accommodation Doctrine Revisited:
Implications in Law and in Policy, 46 ST. MARY’S L.J. 75, 84 (2014) (“[T]he Getty
opinion mentions the idea of ‘conditional submission,’” meaning that a jury must find
the surface owner has proved he or she lacks reasonable alternatives for the pre-
existing surface use before inquiring into whether the mineral owner has reasonable
alternatives. . . . [This] changes the accommodation doctrine from the traditional
three-element test to a four-element test.”).
65. Id. at 90 (“Legislation in Texas that provides protection for surface estate own-
ers is very limited. Solutions to the lack of protection in Texas are also limited; typi-
cally, the theories of nuisance or negligence have governed the standard of liability
for surface damages.”).
66. SHADE & BLACKWELL, supra note 7, at 28–29.
67. Estes & Prieto, supra note 61, at 378–79, 387 (“Representation of agricultural
producers against oil and gas interests utilizing the same surface is an uphill fight
relying solely on the common law. They don’t call it the dominant estate without a
reason.” Id. at 387.).
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III. POOLING
Given that a lessee can generally use as much of the surface as is
reasonably necessary, what happens when a lessee takes multiple
leases and pools the leases together to create an oil and gas unit? The
previous Parts discussed how courts treat the dominant mineral estate
and a mineral owner lessee versus a surface owner. But because of
pooling, a mineral owner can grant a lessee more authority to use the
surface for the benefit of the mineral owner—even if the lessee is not
producing the mineral reservoir directly below the surface.68
Pooling is “the constructive joining of at least two separately owned
tracts . . . so that they are treated as one tract for oil and gas produc-
tion purposes.”69 Pooling is also the bringing together of small tracts
to obtain a well permit under allowable spacing rules.70 Pooling oil
and gas leases to form a unit prevents waste,71 but the idea of pooling
to conserve resources is not new.72 As one scholar noted more than
sixty years ago, “[p]ooling is important in the prevention of drilling of
unnecessary and uneconomic wells, which will usually result in physi-
cal and economic waste.”73
Further, pooling is beneficial to the lessee and the lessor, although
these benefits lean towards the lessee.74 For example, a lessee can
pool multiple smaller tracts to form a tract large enough to drill one
well.75 This also allows a lessee to place a well over the most efficient
area of an oil or gas reservoir.76 Some pooling benefits—such as a
lessee holding multiple leases by only drilling one well—benefit the
lessee more than the lessor; however, pooling benefits lessors as
well.77 Pooling leases to form an oil and gas unit is especially benefi-
cial to lessors with tracts too small to drill a well and produce miner-
als.78 Pooling also benefits lessors because lessors collect royalties
from all wells drilled within a unit, and the lessors can earn a higher
68. See SHADE & BLACKWELL, supra note 7, at 136. Texas courts recognize im-
plied pooling under the community lease and forced pooling under the Mineral Inter-
est Pooling Act; however, both are beyond the scope of this Note, which focuses on
voluntary pooling under the oil and gas lease pooling clause or a separate pooling
agreement. See id. at 129, 132, 136–38.
69. Brady Paul Behrens, Comment, Rule 37 Exceptions and Small Mineral Tracts
in Urban Areas: An Argument for Incorporating Compulsory Pooling into Special
Field Rules in Texas, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1053, 1066 (2012).
70. Clifton A. Squibb, The Age of Allocation: The End of Pooling as We Know It?,
45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 929, 943 (2013).
71. SHADE & BLACKWELL, supra note 7, at 128.
72. See Howard R. Williams, Conservation of Oil and Gas, 65 HARV. L. REV.
1115, 1168 (1952).
73. Id.
74. See SHADE & BLACKWELL, supra note 7, at 136.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Id.
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royalty if the lessee is able to drill several economical wells within the
unit.79
The next Section discusses the oil and gas lease pooling clause in
general. The most common type of voluntary pooling is by the pooling
clause contained in the oil and gas lease.80 However, lessors can also
voluntarily pool by executing or ratifying a separate agreement, such
as a “designation of pooled unit agreement” or “consent to pool
agreement.”81 This Note discusses voluntary pooling under the pool-
ing clause, which has the same effect regardless of whether a lessor
pooled pursuant to an oil and gas lease pooling clause or by separate
agreement.
A. The Pooling Clause
Almost all oil and gas leases contain a pooling clause.82 Generally,
the operator–lessee cannot pool a tract without the mineral owner les-
sor’s express authorization contained in the pooling clause.83 But to be
valid, pooling must strictly comply with provisions in the pooling
clause and the lease.84 Without a pooling clause, the lessee cannot
pool multiple tracts together, and without pooling, only the mineral
owner of the minerals under the tract where a producing well is lo-
cated would receive royalties.85 But if the neighboring tracts cannot
pool with the producing tract, then the mineral owners of the neigh-
boring tracts would not receive royalties, and the producing well
would drain the neighbors’ minerals.86
Lessees must pool the tracts together “in fairness and in good faith,
taking into account the interest(s) of both the lessor and the lessee.”87
Because a lessee can hold an entire tract with a lease under the pool-
ing clause—even if only a portion of the tract is pooled88—courts take
this “good faith” standard seriously.89 However, the lessor has the
79. Id.
80. Id. at 137.
81. Id.
82. Jacqueline L. Weaver, Voluntary Pooling and Unitization, in FUNDAMENTALS
OF OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LAW § 9, at 1 (2013).
83. Jones v. Killingsworth, 403 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. 1965).
84. Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. 2005).
85. Weaver, supra note 82.
86. Id.
87. Elliott v. Davis, 553 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1977, writ
ref’d n.r.e.).
88. In Texas, any mineral production in a pooled unit is considered production
from all tracts in the pooled unit. This allows a lessee to hold all the acreage in an oil
and gas lease by pooling a small amount of the acreage. A Pugh Clause prevents this.
“A Pugh Clause provides that operations or production from the pooled unit will only
preserve the acreage that is within the boundaries of the pooled unit. . . . [it] severs
the unpooled acreage from the pooled acreage.” SHADE & BLACKWELL, supra note 7,
at 138.
89. Weaver, supra note 82, at 6.
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burden of proving that the lessee pooled a tract of land in bad faith.90
Examples of bad faith by lessees include gerrymandering the bounda-
ries of a pooled unit, pooling known bad acreage with productive
acreage, and pooling just before the primary term of an oil and gas
lease expires simply to hold the lease.91
Because a pooling clause is usually a clause contained in the oil and
gas lease, if the lease terminates, one should expect the pooling clause
to terminate as well. Before 2008, pooling was tied to the interest a
lessee acquired in an oil and gas lease.92 In other words, a lessee’s
pooled interest terminated when the oil and gas lease terminated, and
the minerals ceased being subject to the pooling clause or the pooled
unit.93 However, after the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Wagner
& Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, the newly-unleased-tract remains in the
pooled unit.94
B. Pooling Valid After Lease Terminates
After Wagner, pooling continues even after a lease terminates.
There, Sheppard leased her one-eighth mineral interest in a tract of
land in Texas to the operator–lessee, who subsequently pooled Shep-
pard’s lease with other leases to form a pooled gas unit.95 The pooled
unit contained just over 122 acres, and the operator drilled two pro-
ducing wells on Sheppard’s tract.96 The subject lease contained a pro-
vision requiring the lessee pay royalties within 120 days of first selling
the gas, but the lessee’s subsequent failure to follow this provision ter-
minated the oil and gas lease between the lessee and Sheppard.97
At trial, the court first decided the effect of Sheppard’s lease termi-
nating on the pooled unit.98 Sheppard argued that when the lease ter-
minated, it terminated Sheppard’s participation in the pooled unit,
and Sheppard should get one-eighth of the total production from the
two wells because they were both located on her land.99 However, the
lessee argued that Sheppard’s lease did not terminate Sheppard’s par-
ticipation in the pooled unit and that Sheppard should get one-eighth
of Sheppard’s acreage proportionate to the total acreage of the pooled
90. Id.
91. SHADE & BLACKWELL, supra note 7, at 139–40; see, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Underwood, 558 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (gerry-
mandering a unit of 688.02 acres to hold eight leases containing 2,252.03 acres was bad
faith). But see Elliott, 553 S.W.2d at 223 (pooling shortly before lease expired did not
so conclusively establish bad faith to warrant summary judgment in favor of lessors).
92. SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 16, at 4-123 to -124.
93. Id. at 4-124.
94. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008).
95. Id. at 421.
96. Id. at 421–22.
97. Id. at 421.
98. Id. at 422.
99. Id.
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unit, or one-eighth of 51.3% of production.100 The Supreme Court
agreed with the lessee and held that “the termination of Sheppard’s
lease did not terminate her participation in the unit.”101
The Court also held, however, that Sheppard was responsible for
her proportionate share of production costs,102 which is common be-
cause unleased mineral owners become working interest owners.103 A
working interest owner and the lessee must pay all production costs
while the lessor’s royalty is free from production costs.104 Sheppard
argued that she should not have to reimburse the production costs
because Sheppard was a lessor and not a working interest holder when
the operator drilled the well.105 The Court disagreed and wrote that
“Sheppard had the option to continue collecting royalties free of any
drilling costs, as Wagner & Brown offered to reinstate her lease on
that basis.”106 The Court continued, “[h]aving chosen instead (as was
her right) to be a co-tenant with full benefits to the minerals she
owned, it would be inequitable to allow her to escape the burdens that
come with that choice.”107
With its decision in Wagner, the Texas Supreme Court expanded an
operator–lessee’s pooling power—which could change lessees’ ap-
proach to pooling provisions.108 The oil and gas industry did not ex-
pect the Court to rule as it did because previous decisions allowed
pooling only under an effective oil and gas lease.109 Further, the
Court’s ruling in Wagner raised questions about the lessee’s pooling
power and whether the lessee could bind a previous lessor to a pooled
unit; it also lowered the good-faith standard of care a lessee owes a
mineral owner.110 The Court’s decision affects almost all oil and gas
leases in Texas because operators need the pooling provision to meet
the Texas Railroad Commission’s unit spacing requirements and to
produce smaller tracts of land.111
IV. REASONABLE USE IN POOLED UNITS
When a lessee pools several leases and its respective tracts of land
to form a unit, the reasonable use of the surface of each tract of land
100. Id. Sheppard’s acreage (62.72 acres) divided by the total acreage of the pooled
unit (122.15954 acres) equals 51.3%. Id.
101. Id. at 422.
102. Id. at 429–30.
103. SHADE & BLACKWELL, supra note 7, at 19.
104. Id.
105. Wagner, 282 S.W.3d at 429.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Shauna Fitzsimmons, Comment, A Life Beyond the Lease: The Pooling Power
Survives the Termination of the Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV.
719, 741 (2011).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.; see SHADE & BLACKWELL, supra note 7, at 122, 128.
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expands to include the entire surface in the pooled unit.112 The
lessee’s access to the surface can benefit neighboring tracts as long as
the leases are all in the same pooled unit.113 For example, in Robinson
v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., the Court held that the surface owner
had the right to be protected from the mineral owner using the surface
for the benefit of tracts outside of the surface owner’s tract.114 The
surface owner only owned the surface of an eighty-acre tract of
land.115 The surface owner bought the tract subject to a mineral lease
and producing well.116 The operator of the oil well started using the
well on the surface owner’s eighty-acre tract to produce salt water.117
Then the operator used the salt water to produce oil from wells lo-
cated in a different pooled oil and gas unit.118 After the Court held
that the water belonged to the surface estate, it looked at whether the
operator could use the water from this tract to produce the minerals
on separate tracts.119 The Court discussed how a mineral owner has
the right to use the surface, which includes water, to produce minerals
from a tract of land.120 The Court later said, however, that an operator
was not entitled to use the surface estate for the benefit of tracts “not
covered by or authorized to be pooled by the [subject lease].”121 Fi-
nally, the Court held that the mineral owner had the right to use the
water as was reasonably necessary to produce the minerals under the
premises and that the surface owner had the right to not have the
water used to produce oil for the benefit of tracts outside the pooled
unit.122
Forty years later, the Court in Key Operating & Equip., Inc. v.
Hegar distinguished from its decision in Robinson v. Robbins Petro-
leum Corp.123 In Key, the Court held a lessee has the right to use the
surface of a tract within the pooled unit for production of minerals
112. See Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Dixon, 737 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. App.—East-
land 1987, writ denied).
113. Id.
114. Robinson v. Robbins Petroleum Corp., 501 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tex. 1973).
115. Id. at 866.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 867.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 868.
123. Key Operating & Equip., Inc. v. Hegar, 435 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex. 2014) (“The
Hegars assert that Robinson prohibits a mineral lessee from using one surface to aid
operations on another tract. But Robinson is distinguishable from the situation here.
The minerals under Robinson’s surface had not been, and could not be, pooled with
tracts where the water was being used. . . . And Robinson himself recognized that the
lack of pooling was significant, arguing in the court of appeals that he had authority to
control use of the water subject to a lessee’s water use to assist with production under
his tract or ‘underlying tracts pooled therewith.’” (citation omitted)).
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anywhere within the pooled unit.124 Key Operating was the lessee and
operator of a forty-acre pooled unit.125 After Key created the forty-
acre pooled unit, the plaintiffs bought an eighty-five-acre tract of land
containing ten acres within Key’s forty-acre unit.126 Key used a road
on the ten-acre tract of land to access the producing well in the pooled
unit, and the plaintiffs were aware of this when they bought the tract
of land.127 Roughly two years after purchasing the tract of land, the
surface owners built a house on the tract and used Key’s road to ac-
cess the house.128 Initially, the surface owners did not attempt to pre-
vent Key from also using the road; however, Key drilled another well
on the forty-acre unit, which caused the traffic to increase on the
road.129 The plaintiff-surface-owners filed suit against Key seeking an
injunction to prevent Key from using the plaintiff’s surface to produce
the minerals on an adjacent tract of land also within the forty-acre
unit.130 Although the plaintiffs’ ten-acre-tract was in the forty-acre
pooled unit, the plaintiffs brought in a petroleum engineer who
proved the producing well and mineral drainage area was not reaching
the minerals below the plaintiffs’ ten-acre tract.131
The trial court and court of appeals ruled in favor of the surface
owners and held that Key did not have the right to use the plaintiffs’
surface to produce minerals from another tract in the pooled unit.132
Further, the lower courts held that Key could use the plaintiffs’ sur-
face only to produce oil below the plaintiffs’ surface.133 The Texas Su-
preme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions and held Key has
the right to use the surface of any of the tracts within the forty-acre
unit to produce the minerals.134 The Court held that production from
a tract within a pooled unit is legal production from all tracts within
the pooled unit.135 The Court concluded that once the forty-acre
pooled unit was created, then the tracts within the unit were no longer
separate.136 Finally, in dicta, the Court discussed how a mineral owner
has the right to ingress and egress over the surface to produce miner-
als; therefore, the right to ingress and egress also covered the surface
of all pooled acreage within a unit.137
124. Id. at 801.
125. Id. at 796.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 796–97.
132. Id. at 797.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 798, 801.
135. Id. at 798.
136. Id. at 799.
137. Id. at 800.
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If the Court’s decision in Key by itself does not grant a lessee access
to the surface of all tracts within a pooled unit,138 synthesizing its rul-
ing with a case twenty-five years prior certainly should. In Delhi Gas
Pipeline Corp. v. Dixon, the Court held that a mineral owner could
grant a pipeline easement for transporting gas from a well not located
on the leased tract but within the same pooled unit.139 The minerals
were severed six years before the mineral owner signed the oil and gas
lease.140 The timing of the severance compared to the oil and gas lease
is important.141 The oil and gas lease authorized the lessee to lay a
pipeline across the tract and included a pooling clause.142 The pipeline
going across the surface of the subject land only transported gas from
the pooled unit.143 The Court held the mineral owner could grant an
easement across the surface of a tract for transporting gas from a well
with which the tract was pooled.144 In dicta, the Court said the lessee
could not transport gas not from the unit’s well in the pipeline without
an agreement from the surface owner.145 What happens when one
synthesizes Key and Delhi? This is discussed below.
V. POTENTIAL UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES
Because Texas case law is the predominant authority for oil and gas
law in the country,146 it is important to be aware of unforeseen scena-
rios and restrictions that may arise when one synthesizes Texas juris-
prudence. This Part discusses a few of those extreme scenarios that
could significantly expand a lessee’s reasonable use of the surface to
effectuate its oil and gas lease.
A. Pooling Agreement Valid Post-Severance
With its decision in Key, the Texas Supreme Court appeared to give
operator–lessees free reasonable use of the surface of a unit for the
benefit of any producing well within that unit.147 But a close reading
of Key reveals that the minerals were leased and pooled before the
surface and minerals were severed. In other words, when the surface
owners acquired the surface, they took the surface subject to the lease
138. See supra Section II.B (discussing limits on lease access to the surface).
139. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Dixon, 737 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. App.—Eastland
1987, writ denied).
140. Id. at 97.
141. See infra Section V.A.
142. Delhi Gas, 737 S.W.2d at 97.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 98.
145. Id.
146. See Ernest E. Smith, Implications of a Fiduciary Standard of Conduct for the
Holder of the Executive Right, 64 TEX. L. Rev. 371, 375 n.13 (1985) (“Other states
frequently look to Texas decisions when confronted with a new or unsettled issue of
oil and gas law.”).
147. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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and pooling agreement. The chain of events is important. What if the
pooling agreement was not already in place when the surface owners
acquired the surface? Would the Court have found that a subsequent
pooling agreement could burden the surface owner of a ten-acre tract
of land for production anywhere within a forty-acre unit? What if we
take it a step further: Subject to the Texas Railroad Commission’s
Field Rules, some pooling agreements can go as high as 640 acres.148
Will Texas jurisprudence allow a 640-acre pooled unit to burden the
surface of a ten-acre tract of land? When one synthesizes Key with
Delhi, the answer appears to be yes.
When the severance occurred in Key, the mineral estate was subject
to the prior pooling agreement. Subsequently, the operator–lessee
burdened the surface estate for the benefit of the pooled unit when
the operator used a road across the surface owners’ tract to access a
new well within the pooled unit. The surface owners sued, and the
Texas Supreme Court found in favor of the operator–lessee. How-
ever—unlike Key where the minerals were already subject to a pool-
ing agreement when the severance occurred—in Delhi, the minerals
were not subject to a pooling agreement at the time of severance. In
Delhi, the surface owner acquired the surface estate six years before
the mineral owner entered an oil and gas lease containing a pooling
clause.
The timing of the mineral severance compared to the pooling agree-
ment in the chain-of-title of both Key and Delhi is the focus here. In
Key, the surface owner acquired the surface subject to the oil and gas
lease, and the Court allowed the operator to access that surface to
reach other wells contained within the pooled unit. In Delhi, the sur-
face owner acquired the surface before the mineral owner and opera-
tor entered into an oil and gas lease, and the court still allowed the
operator to lay pipeline across the surface to transport minerals from
other wells within the pooled unit. Synthesizing these two cases means
a mineral owner of a tract can enter a contract—a pooling agree-
ment—after the surface owner acquires the surface of the tract, and
courts will still enforce the subsequent contract.149
If a landowner acquires the surface of a tract of land not subject to
an oil and gas lease or pooling agreement, why would the new surface
owner contemplate the excess burden on the tract by a subsequent
lease and pooling agreement between an operator and a mineral
owner? If a pooling agreement is a contract between a lessee and min-
eral owner, this means a court can rule that a contract between the
mineral owner and lessee actually expands the dominant estate theory
148. Bruce M. Kramer, Oil and Gas Leases and Pooling: A Look Back and a Peek
Ahead, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 877, 891 (2013).
149. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 424 (Tex. 2008) (“[O]il
and gas leases in general, and pooling clauses in particular, are a matter of contract.”).
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on a surface owner who was not privy to the pooling agreement to
include all lands within a pooled unit.
With the Court’s rulings in Key and Delhi, in theory, a developer
could buy a large parent tract of land—600 acres for example—break
it up into sixty smaller ten-acre tracts, and sell all the tracts while re-
serving the minerals. After selling the surface of all sixty tracts of land
and reserving all the minerals thereunder, this developer could sign an
oil and gas lease with a pooling agreement covering all tracts within
the 600-acre parent tract. The operator–lessee could then pool the
sixty ten-acre tracts with a forty-acre tract. This would allow the lessee
to burden the surface estate of each ten-acre-tract for the benefit of
the pooled unit anywhere within the 640-acre pooled unit, subject to
the normal restrictions of negligence, reasonable use, and the Accom-
modation Doctrine.
To take it a step further, what if all but one ten-acre tract in the 640-
acre pooled unit is landlocked? In theory, an operator could build and
use a road across the non-landlocked ten-acre tract to access every
well drilled in the oil and gas unit.150 In other words, the surface
owner of a ten-acre tract of land—who acquired the ten-acre tract
before the mineral owner entered a pooling agreement—would now
be burdened by the dominant mineral estate of that non-landlocked
ten-acre tract plus the additional 630 acres contained in the pooled
unit. This example is extreme, but under current Texas jurisprudence
it could be a reality. The issue is not that the minerals are dominant to
the surface; the issue is the dominance of these minerals can expand
the burden of a surface owner exponentially pursuant to a post-sever-
ance contract—the pooling agreement. And with the Wagner ruling,
this example could be even more extreme, which Section B discusses
further.
B. Lessee’s Post-Severance Surface-use Valid
After Lease Terminates
Now take the synthesized rule discussed in Section A, and add the
Court’s ruling in Wagner. In Wagner, the Court held the mineral
owner was still bound by the pooling clause contained in the oil and
gas lease after the oil and gas lease terminated when the lessee failed
to make royalty payments on time. In the most extreme example dis-
cussed above, an operator accessed every well in a 640-acre unit via
the surface of the only non-landlocked tract in the unit.151
In this example, the surface owner acquired the surface before the
mineral owner and operator entered an oil and gas lease with a pool-
150. In one extreme example, a cotton farmer in Texas had sixteen wells on his 640-
acre tract of land. See Aman Batheja, West Texas Oil Drilling Frustrates Some Farm-
ers, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.texastribune.org/2014/10/31/county-re-
sents-oil-drilling-despite-money-it-bring [https://perma.cc/YC2B-73Y8].
151. See discussion supra Section V.A.
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ing clause.152 Now assume, like in Wagner, that the first well produces
minerals from the 640-acre unit and that the lessee fails to adhere to
the terms of the lease, causing the lease holding the only tract by
which the operator could access the 640-acre unit to terminate. Pursu-
ant to Wagner, the pooling agreement is still valid, and the operator of
the 640-acre pooled unit can still burden the surface of this ten-acre
tract without a valid oil and gas lease for the benefit of the entire 640-
acre pooled unit to perform any function the lessee deems reasonably
necessary to “effectuate [the] purpose”153 of a lease that no longer
exists.
On one side is a surface owner of a ten-acre tract of land burdened
by an operator’s use of the surface to produce minerals from a 640-
acre unit because of a now-terminated oil and gas lease with a pooling
clause that the surface owner was not subject to when the surface was
acquired. On the other side is an oil and gas operator who can reason-
ably burden the surface of a ten-acre tract for the benefit of 640 min-
eral acres, even though the oil and gas lease for the mineral estate of
this ten-acre tract terminated after the operator failed to adhere to the
terms of its own oil and gas lease. Although the operator has a duty to
perform as a reasonable and prudent operator,154 this duty is to the
mineral owner—not the surface owner. These extreme scenarios illus-
trate the need for solutions to protect surface owners without restrict-
ing the dominance of the mineral estate. The next Part offers some
recommendations.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The struggle between operators and surface owners is not going
away. At least two-thirds of the farmers in Texas do not own their
minerals,155 and that number is likely to increase as more fee owners
reserve their minerals when selling the surface estate. Further, as the
population grows, so does the demand for oil and gas. It is important
to find a solution that benefits both the surface owner and the opera-
tor–lessee. The simplest solution does not necessarily limit operators
or require any substantial change in Texas jurisprudence; instead, it
focuses on giving both the operator and surface owner notice of whom
each is dealing and what each can expect from the other—a surface-
use agreement.
A. Surface-use Agreements
Some operators already voluntarily enter surface-use agreements
with surface owners, but the Texas Railroad Commission could take
152. See discussion supra Section V.A.
153. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
154. SHADE & BLACKWELL, supra note 7, at 45.
155. Batheja, supra note 150.
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this a step further and require full disclosure to the surface owners in
addition to requiring a good-faith attempt to enter a surface-use
agreement with the surface owners.
A surface-use agreement is a contract between a surface owner and
operator where the operator pays consideration to the surface owner
in exchange for the right to use the surface in accordance with the
agreement.156 The surface-use agreement sets forth restrictions and
surface provisions the operator must follow. Although this sounds like
the surface owner is receiving all the benefit, surface-use agreements
are beneficial to operators as well. First, this surface-use agreement
gives the surface owner notice that the operator will burden the sur-
face and sets out damage provisions the operator will pay as needed.
This could avoid litigation between the operator and surface owner
because the parties know what to expect, plus each side could con-
sider adding an arbitration clause. Although the operator may win a
suit in the end, if the suit from the surface owner was an injunction to
prevent the operator from being on the surface, then the operator just
wins the right to continue doing what it was already doing at the cost
of a lot of time and money defending itself. This means litigation is
expensive for the operator, win or lose. Further, the cost of litigation
could be higher if the surface owner wins an injunction and the opera-
tor is required to move or stop operations.
The surface-use agreement benefits the surface owner because the
surface owner can get money for damage to the surface without hav-
ing to file suit. Not only does this save the surface owner the cost of
litigation, it also provides the surface owner with notice and peace-of-
mind knowing what to expect. Further, in Texas jurisprudence there is
no duty for an operator to enter a surface-use agreement with the
surface owner, so doing this shows good faith by the operator and can
help ease the pain of the reality that the surface is the servient estate.
And if the well is successful, the surface owner and operator could
work together for several years, and a surface-use agreement is a great
way to start and maintain a great relationship between the parties.
However, some surface owners may refuse to sign a surface agree-
ment regardless of how it benefits them. If the Texas Railroad Com-
mission requires a good-faith effort by the operator to enter a surface
agreement with the surface owner, the surface owner will have notice
and full disclosure that the minerals beneath the surface are leased
and pooled—even if the surface owner refuses to enter the agreement.
156. Oil & Gas Exploration and Surface Ownership, RAILROAD COMMISSION OF
TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about-us/resource-center/faqs/oil-gas-exploration-and-
surface-ownership/ [https://perma.cc/W38H-UZRV] (“[T]he surface owner may wish
to contact the lessee company to attempt to negotiate an agreement restricting use of
the surface or agreeing to set damages for surface use. Although there is no legal
requirement to do so, a lessee may be willing to enter into a reasonable surface use/
damages agreement to avoid potential disputes.”).
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A surface owner may not like it, but the surface owner will know what
to expect. Because this requirement is only a good-faith effort by the
operator, the surface owner cannot delay or prevent operations with
bad-faith negotiation tactics. Further, if the surface owner is on notice
about an operator’s plans and the surface owner sues for negligence,
the court may be more likely to find some contributory negligence by
the surface owner if the surface owner had notice of the specific inci-
dent that led to the negligence claim.
In addition, simply knowing a surface owner refuses to enter a sur-
face-use agreement is beneficial to an operator. By requiring an oper-
ator make a good-faith effort to acquire a surface-use agreement with
the surface owner, the operator learns the type of surface owner with
whom the operator is dealing. Most surface owners do not want to feel
taken advantage of by an operator and want notice so they can know
what to expect during the drilling of the oil and gas well. However,
some surface owners will not enter a surface agreement—but knowing
a surface owner has that attitude towards an operator can help an
operator when it plans the unit or drilling schedule. An operator may
perform more cautiously if the operator knows it is dealing with a
surface owner who refuses to sign versus an amenable surface owner
with whom the operator has a working relationship.
For example, an operator may have two choices for the access road
leading to the pad site. While the operator may prefer to place the
road across the surface of the unyielding surface owner, building the
road across the land of the surface owner who entered the surface-use
agreement could potentially save the operator time and money. By
moving the road, the operator may avoid future litigation with the
unyielding surface owner, and the unyielding surface owner success-
fully keeps the surface unencumbered by the operator’s road. In the
long run, the operator, the yielding surface owner, and the unyielding
surface owner should be happier about the situation and have more
money in their pockets than if the operator had not known the atti-
tude of the unyielding surface owner before the operator built the ac-
cess road.
The good-faith attempt by the operator could follow the same stan-
dard required in the pooling agreement.157 Whether an operator made
a good-faith effort to enter a surface-use agreement would be a ques-
tion of fact.158 Further, the operator would be required to act as a
reasonable, prudent operator considering its own interests and the in-
terest of the surface owner.159 Similar to pooling clauses, the date an
operator attempts to acquire the surface-use agreement, compared to
the date the operator drilled the well, could also show good or bad
157. Gina S. Warren & Mark G. Walston, Pooling Clauses and Statutes, in OIL, GAS
& ENERGY RESOURCES LAW 101, at 2 (2013).
158. Id.
159. See id.
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faith.160 Therefore, the good-faith standard would extend to both the
surface-use agreement and to whether the operator contacted the sur-
face owner in a timely manner before drilling the well.
Requiring an operator to make a good-faith effort to enter a surface
agreement with a surface owner will save the operator money without
a substantial amount of additional time and effort. There are other
options the legislature might consider; however, additional options
may limit the rights of the operator and cost the operator more than
surface-use agreements.
B. Other Options
Requiring the operator attempt to enter a surface-use agreement
with the surface owners is likely the easiest and most efficient way to
attempt to remedy the tension between the two parties. However,
there may still be situations where the operator has no other options
other than using the surface of an unyielding and upset surface
owner.161 Additional solutions are likely too little—educating surface
owners—or too extreme—changing Texas oil and gas law.
Educating surface owners and encouraging surface owners to work
with mineral owners before an operator reaches out to acquire an oil
and gas lease would benefit the surface owner more than the operator.
A surface owner could contract with a mineral owner to require provi-
sions in the oil and gas lease requiring the surface owner’s opinion
before the operator changes the surface. Further, the mineral owner
could require the operator to restore completely the surface to pre-
drilling conditions when production is finished. Education could also
inform and encourage the surface owner to acquire a slight interest in
the mineral estate, simply so the surface owner could take part in ne-
gotiations with the operator–lessee.
The downside to education is its cost. First, educating surface own-
ers requires mailers or television, radio, and Internet announcements.
This shotgun approach is not efficient compared to the target audi-
ence of surface owners who do not own their minerals. The Texas
Railroad Commission could build an education fund into its permit
costs or operators could fund this as a show of good faith. But if the
education campaign is effective and a surface owner and mineral
owner agree to provisions too steep for the operator, then the opera-
tor may not lease the minerals at all, which goes against Texas’s public
policy of encouraging oil and gas production. Not to mention mineral
owners will be hesitant to make deals with surface owners in the fu-
ture if it starts costing the mineral owners money. In the end, educa-
tion would likely create awareness without making any substantial
impact on this issue.
160. See id.
161. See discussion supra Sections V.A–B.
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Creating regulations and laws requiring restrictions in oil and gas
leases designed to protect surface owners is the most guaranteed way
to address this issue. The Texas Legislature or the Texas Railroad
Commission could require a provision in the oil and gas lease restrict-
ing surface-use in a pooled unit to the surface above the leased miner-
als and not for the benefit of the entire unit without a surface-use
agreement. Additionally, the legislature could create a rule that a
pooling agreement terminates with the oil and gas lease to correct the
precedent from Wagner.162 This would protect the surface owners
from the extreme post-severance examples discussed in Part V. Once
an operator knows what the pooling rules are, it can adjust its drilling
plans and schedule accordingly.
However, restricting the operator’s use of the pooling agreement
goes against one of the main reasons for pooling—preventing
waste.163 Additionally, restricting the operator’s rights under the oil
and gas lease erodes the dominance of the mineral estate. Restricting
pooling agreements, oil and gas leases, and the mineral estate is inap-
posite with public policy and over sixty-five years of Texas jurispru-
dence. Education programs would likely be insufficient, and statutes
and regulations would likely be overkill.
VII. CONCLUSION
The tension between lessees and surface owners is not new. The
mineral estate is the dominant estate to encourage production of oil
and gas. The last decade has shown that the states that can ride the
boom of oil and gas production have healthy economies because of all
the jobs and money producing oil and gas brings to an economy.164
Further, more energy is needed as the country grows. But as our coun-
try grows and requires more energy, more oil and gas companies and
surface owners are crossing paths. The solution is balance—because of
the recent booms in subsurface energy, more surface owners do not
own their minerals now, which adds to the tension. Requiring that
operators make a good-faith effort to enter surface-use agreements
with surface owners should benefit both parties. The operator can set
expectations with the surface owner while making a few concessions
to avoid the cost of future litigation, and surface owners can feel more
involved with the process while earning money for their troubles. Op-
erators and surface owners working together is the key to overcoming
the tension between the two parties as our country’s dependency on
natural resources increases.
162. See discussion supra Section III.B.
163. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
164. See Jobs, Growth & Security, ENERGY TOMORROW, http://www.energytomor
row.org/jobs-growth-and-security [https://perma.cc/J4WC-PRDZ].
